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Abstract  
The construction industry in Ghana, like many others worldwide, has had its fair share of damning 
independent reviews. Huge and unsustainable foreign debt, excessive budget deficits, huge 
contractual payment arrears, poor construction performance, corruption and pressure from 
international financial institutions, forced the government to commit to a reform of public 
procurement, which culminated in the passing of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663). The 
paper outlines the events leading to, and features of, the public procurement reform in Ghana and 
analyses its potential impact and the unique challenges it presents. Comparisons are also drawn 
from relevant scenarios in other countries. The paper concludes that while the Procurement Act sets 
out the legal, institutional and regulatory framework to secure fiscal transparency and public 
accountability, the sole reliance on traditional contracting and price-based selection limits the scope 
for the value for money achievable. Expanding the reforms to cover procurement and project 
delivery methods and strategies, with a focus on ‘best value’, will increase the potential and 
likelihood of achieving value for money in public construction in Ghana. 
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BACKGROUND 
A low-income economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is a country of firsts. In 1957, it was the first 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa to emerge from colonialism. It experienced the highest GDP on the 
continent before an economic crisis in the late 1970s, and was the first survive the trauma of 
military takeovers. It rebounded after launching one of the first and more stringent economic 
recovery programmes in the region two decades ago. However, falling prices for gold and cocoa, 
and rising prices for petroleum imports led to a sharp deterioration in 1999-2000. Through a World 
Bank-assisted macroeconomic programme, Ghana has made a robust recovery and achieved a fairly 
stable macroeconomic environment. These reforms also culminated in a new vision of Ghana that 
emphasizes wealth creation, improved governance and reduced income and regional inequalities. A 
critical component of this new vision is the government's efforts to promote the private sector as the 
  
engine of economic growth. The Government has also identified construction as a priority sector for 
foreign and private investment.  
 
An approximate annual value of public procurement for goods, works, and consultant services has 
been given as US$600 million [World Bank 2003] representing about 10% of the country’s GDP. 
The bulk of the expenditure programmes of Ministries, Departments, Agencies (MDAs) and District 
Assemblies (DAs) involve capital construction procurement [Westring 1997]. Any improvement in 
the public procurement system will therefore have a direct and substantial impact on the overall 
economic situation of the country and result in budgetary savings and efficiency in government 
expenditures. However, successive reviews have revealed substantial inefficiencies and concluded 
that value for money was not being achieved in both government- and donor-financed procurement. 
The Public Procurement Act (PPA) (Act 663) was enacted in 2003 to address these weaknesses in 
public procurement. This paper explores the major issues in construction procurement in Ghana and 
analyses the potential impact of the Public Procurement Act on the search for VfM in public 
construction procurement.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
All around the world, public infrastructure services needs are fast outpacing the resources for 
providing them. These socio-economic realities have intensified the search for more innovative 
means of delivering public services and the need to achieve value for money. However, a persisting 
spectre of adversarial contracting, sub-optimal outcomes and the deteriorating quality of 
construction workforce and health and safety performance have threatened to derail efforts aimed at 
delivering value for money in public construction. Many construction reviews in the developed 
economies, for example the Latham [1994] report in the UK and the Tang [2001] report in Hong 
Kong, lamented these developments and made sweeping recommendations for industry reform. 
Following these, ambitious targets have been set. Some examples include Accelerating Change in 
the UK and Construction 2020 in Australia. The case histories of construction in these developed 
economies and their reform efforts and successes have been told and recounted in many forums. 
The story has largely not been told of the construction industries in low-income countries, whose 
problems have been further exacerbated by fiscal and monetary constraints and corruption.  
 
Based on a review of literature, this paper outlines the events leading to, and features of, the 
construction procurement reform in Ghana and analyses its potential impact on VfM and the unique 
challenges it presents. Comparisons are also drawn from relevant scenarios in other countries. Even 
though the paper focuses on the construction industry in Ghana, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the case histories enacted here are representative of the situations in many African and 
some Asian countries [Aniekwu and Okpala 1988, Kumaraswamy 1994, Rwelamila et al. 1999]. 
The issues discussed herein are therefore of broader significance to many developing economies. 
Considering that the bulk of the global construction market demand is shifting to the developing 
economies, the issues discussed here will be of significant importance to consultants, contractors 
and service providers in developed economies that are looking for ways to finance their 
construction budgets and increase the networth of their companies.  The paper starts by outlining 
the existing framework for public construction procurement. Construction performance is then 
discussed and comparators are drawn from other countries. The public procurement reform 
programme is then presented. Notable provisions of the PPA are highlighted and the impact/ 
  
significance of the PPA within the broader concept of VfM is analysed. Relevant recommendations 
are offered for extending the scope and potential for VfM in public construction in Ghana.    
 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
There is no comprehensive guidance on the scope and procedures of public construction 
procurement in Ghana. The procurement of construction works and services have been regulated 
mainly through circulars from the Ministry of Finance, which complement a set of procedures 
evolved by convention in connection with the control of procurement exercised by the ministry. 
Central, regional and district tender boards process and award contracts within thresholds defined 
by the Ministry of Finance. World Bank projects use the World Bank Procurement Guidelines 
[World Bank 1995] and the World Bank Consultant Guidelines [World Bank 1997]. The 
procurement method used for public works is the traditional method, with design split from 
construction. There is a provision for mandatory registration and classification of contractors under 
guidelines administered by the Ministry of Works and Housing. However, the MDAs and many 
DAs maintain separate lists for the pre-qualification of contractors and use different standard 
conditions of contract for works procurement. World Bank-administered projects use the FIDIC 
conditions of contract for works contracts and shortlists for the selection of consultants.  
 
The classification by the Ministry of Works and Housing has been observed to be too general and 
obsolete and the registration criteria, lists of contractors and monetary thresholds are not regularly 
updated [Eyiah and Cook 2003, World Bank 1996]. Except for major or complex assignments, most 
government-financed architectural consultancy services and project supervision have been assigned 
to the Architectural and Engineering Services Limited on sole basis [World Bank 1996]. The 
shortlists used on World Bank-administered projects for the selection of consultants have been 
observed to be repetitive, with the same firms recurrently selected in civil engineering and building 
works supervision [World Bank 1996]. Many instances of a single contractor buying and pricing all 
the bidding documents, and of the award of a number of contracts (or lots) to the same 
contractor/supplier, under different contracting names have also been observed [Crown Agents 
1998, Westring 1997].  
 
 
CONSTRUCTION PERFORMANCE 
The performance of construction in Ghana is poor and many reports have decried the public sector’s 
lack of commercial edge in the exercise of its procurement function. Contracts for both works and 
consultancy services take very lengthy periods to reach financial closure and are subject to 
unnecessary delays [Crown Agents 1998, Westring 1997]. Westring [1997] attributes the causes of 
the delays to extensive post-award negotiations, delays in the preparation of technical specifications 
and drawings, delays in evaluation, an extensive system of controls, reviews and approvals, and 
land ownership disputes. Project implementation has itself been characterised by extensive cost and 
time overruns and poor quality [Crown Agents 1998, Westring 1997, World Bank 1996, 2003]. The 
process for payment to contractors and suppliers is also long, involving over thirty steps from 
invoice to receipt of the payment cheque, and often over-centralized, thus leading to delays in 
project execution [Eyiah and Cook 2003, Westring 1997, World Bank 2003]. Fiscal constraints and 
poor procurement practices (as outlined above) have led to insecurity of funding for construction 
projects and created a constant spectre of delayed payments and payment arrears to contractors and 
  
consultants [World Bank 1996].  The accumulated interest on late payments and the frequent price 
changes due to extensive renegotiations, further exacerbate the funding problem [World Bank 
2003].  
 
Consultants and contractors encounter difficulties in processing claims arising from escalation 
clauses and are indirectly pressured not to push forward these claims [World Bank 1996, 2003]. 
Many private sector entities delivering works and services to government establishments try to limit 
their losses by cutting corners or abandoning the work altogether [Westring 1997]. This often has 
negative consequences for project execution and leads to adversarial relationships developing 
between contractors and clients. There is reduced respect for contracts entered into with neither 
party to the contract expecting it to be fully binding. Small contracts and ad hoc approaches are 
favoured at the expense of full-fledged competitive bidding for economic sized projects. Long-term 
strategic planning by both public and private sectors is difficult and so is the monitoring and control 
of procurement [Ayirebi 2005, Westring 1997]. Some procuring entities also resort to making 
contractual payments before the due dates in order to prevent a budget allocation lapse and advance 
mobilisation funds provided to contractors can exceed considerably the 15% allowable [Westring 
1997, World Bank 1996]. Contract management is very poor and so are the training and working 
conditions of the construction workforce [World Bank 2003].  
 
 
GHANAIAN CONSTRUCTION - A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE  
This paper focuses on the construction industry in Ghana. Such a focus provides a comprehensive 
case history of Ghana’s procurement reform journey, which makes it easier to model, compare with 
other construction industries and evaluate the suitability/ applicability of strategies developed in 
other countries. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the case histories enacted 
here are representative of the situations in many Sub-Saharan African countries in particular 
[Aniekwu and Okpala 1988, Lopes 1998, Rwelamila et al. 1999, Rwelamila and Meyer 1996]. 
Similar comparators can be drawn in Asia [Kumaraswamy 1994]. The inadequacy of, or deficits in, 
existing infrastructure services and a rapidly increasing population have left the public sectors in 
these countries struggling to cope. The infrastructure services required are invariably basic in nature 
- housing, hospitals, schools, water, and sanitation. These harsh realities have intensified the search 
for more innovative means of delivering public services and the need to demonstrate value for 
money in public construction procurement. The issues discussed in this paper are, therefore, of 
broader significance to the global construction industry.  
 
 
THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORM PROGRAMME  
The public procurement reform programme is part of a wider reform agenda targeted at improving 
public financial management.  The objectives of the procurement reform proposals are to [Ministry 
of Finance 2001]: promote national development; enhance harmony with other local and 
international laws; foster competition, efficiency, transparency and accountability; facilitate ease of 
procurement administration; and, ensure value for money. Annual savings of about US$150 million 
are envisaged through better management of government-financed procurement alone [World Bank 
2003]. A key deliverable of the procurement reform was a draft Public Procurement Bill, which was 
enacted into law by Parliament in 2003.  Direct measures also undertaken by Government include: 
the issuance and monitoring of expenditure ceilings for each MDA consistent with the annual 
  
budget and updated cash flow forecasts; and implementing new anti-corruption strategies including 
codes of conduct for state officials. All procuring entities must seek clearance from the Ministry of 
Finance, through certification as proof of the availability and adequacy of funding, before any 
works contract is awarded.  
 
 
THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ACT (ACT 663) 
The PPA establishes the five basic pillars of public procurement [World Bank 2003]: (1) 
comprehensive, transparent legal and institutional framework; (2) clear and standardised 
procurement procedures and standard tender documents; (3) independent control system; (4) 
proficient procurement staff; and (5) anti-corruption measures. Some notable provisions in this Act 
are highlighted below.  
 
Legal and institutional framework 
The PPA provides for the establishment of a Public Procurement Board (the Board) (s.1) as a legal 
corporate entity. Procurement entities are defined as comprising MDAs and all para-statal 
establishments that utilise public funds (s.14). A tender committee in each procurement entity 
provides a one-stop shop for concurrent approvals, awards and management of contracts to 
predefined value thresholds (s.17). The tender committee may make use of external consultants in 
the performance of its functions. The tender committee shall refer any procurement exceeding its 
value threshold to the appropriate tender review board at the district, regional, ministerial or central 
government level. The tender review board reviews all procurement activities for compliance with 
the PPA, provides concurrent approval or otherwise of procurement referrals, hears complaints and 
escalates unresolved issues to the Board (s.20).  
 
Procurement procedures and documentation 
Parts III-V stipulate procedures for the sizing of tender packages, soliciting and evaluating tenders 
and for contract award. In particular, s.22 provides for the pre-qualification of tenderers for large 
and/ or complex works and technical services contracts. All contracts must be tendered on an open 
competitive basis, except otherwise provided for in the Act (s.35). Restricted tendering is justifiable 
only on the grounds of providing greater economy and efficiency and subject to the approval of the 
Board (s.38). Two-stage tendering is only allowed where detailed specifications cannot be made 
available before going to tender (s.36) or the optimal solution is unknown and tenders are solicited 
to provide this. National Competitive Bidding shall be used when the procurement entity so decides 
(s.44) and subject to contract value thresholds specified in Schedule 3. International Competitive 
Bidding shall be used when effective competition cannot be achieved without the inclusion of 
foreign firms (s.45).  
 
All procurement must use the appropriate standard tender/ contract document provided in Schedule 
4 and modifications can only be introduced through tender/ contract data sheets or special 
conditions of contract (s.50). The successful tender for works contracts shall be the lowest evaluated 
tender price ascertained on the basis of criteria specified in the invitation documents, which shall 
include (s.59): (1) the tender price subject to any margin of preference for domestic contractors 
(s.60); (2) the lifecycle costs of the tendered solution; (3) the potential for economic development, 
local involvement or technology transfer; and (4) national security considerations. The selection of 
  
consultants shall be on quality and cost-based criteria (s.75) with the price component assessed in a 
similar manner as for works (s.69). Quality-based selection is allowed for complex or highly 
specialised assignments (s.72), and least-cost selection is reserved for small value assignments. 
  
Procurement oversight, capacity building and anti-corruption measures 
The Board’s duties include, to (s.3): provide policy and regulatory oversight; provide training and 
capacity building for procurement officials; hear appeals and complaints; and, assist local industries 
to become competitive and efficient suppliers to the public sector. The Board shall maintain a 
database of all suppliers, contractors and consultants and shall debar from procurement practice 
under the PPA, and publish the list of, all suppliers, contractors and consultants with proven 
misconduct under the Act. The right to review is provided for in section 78. The head of the 
procurement entity must first investigate a complaint (s.79) and then, if unresolved within the time 
frame allowed, the complainant may seek administrative review by the Board (s.80). Third parties 
whose interests may be affected by the review proceedings are permitted to participate in them. The 
Board shall establish and publish a code of conduct for all procurement officials, the Board, tender 
review boards as well as for suppliers, contractors and consultants (s.86). Corrupt practices, as 
defined in the Constitution and the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), are outlawed under the PPA 
(s.93). Violation of any provision of the Act, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine not exceeding 
1000 penalty units or a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years or both (s.92). 
 
Scope of application 
The PPA applies to all procurement financed in whole or in part from public funds (s.14). 
Notwithstanding this provision, procurement with international obligations arising from any grant 
or concessionary loan to the government shall be in accordance with the terms of the grant or loan 
(s.86).  However, it has been suggested that the World Bank/ FIDIC procurement procedures are 
used on World Bank-administered projects because MDAs have no set of comprehensive guidelines 
for procurement [Westring 1997, World Bank 1996]. There is therefore reason to expect that donor 
partners will defer to the use of the PPA. The agreement between the Ministry of Health and its 
cooperating partners, under a World Bank-administered programme, to organise procurement under 
specific Ministry of Health procedures is perhaps evidence of this expectation [World Bank 2003]. 
 
 
ACHIEVING VfM IN CONSTRUCTION  
The five basic pillars of a ‘well functioning procurement fiduciary management’ are all addressed in 
the PPA, which if completely implemented will create the necessary conditions for ‘best value’, 
transparency and accountability in public sector construction procurement [World Bank 2003]. 
However, the procurement reforms described above are not, of themselves, sufficient conditions for 
the achievement of VfM. The 2003 CPAR acknowledges this fact and calls for improved contract 
management and greater professionalism in the procurement function. The sole reliance upon the 
traditional method and the use of largely price-based contractor selection criteria seem to be 
fundamental mistakes [see e.g., Palaneeswaran et al. 2001, Rwelamila et al. 1999]. The designer’s 
focus on reputation and the contractor’s preoccupation with price competition and cost reduction 
often leads to conflict and lack of cooperation. This lack of cooperation has permeated the various 
construction professions and academic institutions in the country. The objectives of public 
implementing agencies tend to be aligned with the traditional method and projects are configured to 
spend available funds while the longer-term sustainability aspects are often ignored. Rwelamila and 
  
Meyer [1996] demonstrate how this ‘fixed constraints syndrome’ (p.44) has contributed to the poor 
balancing of project priorities and consequently, poor construction performance in Southern Africa 
Development Community countries. These trends mean that dramatic changes are required in the 
way infrastructure projects are procured. 
 
Rationalist procurement theory considers the interplay of time, cost, quality and finance as the 
primary determinants of value in construction procurement and provides criteria for the selection 
and use of any particular procurement arrangement [Rowlinson 1999b]. These procurement systems 
and delivery modalities are, however, not without their limitations. There seems to be a lack of 
consensus on procurement assessment criteria and, hence, on the relative performance of different 
procurement paths [Hamilton 1987]. There are inconsistencies in procurement systems definitions 
and terminology [Rowlinson 1999a].  The procurement selection practices of construction clients’ 
have been observed to deviate markedly from procurement theory, employing rather simplistic 
selection criteria and sometimes yielding outcomes that are at variance with procurement theory 
[Bowen et al. 1997]. The procurement arrangements adopted sometimes even defy classification 
under any of the generic procurement routes [Tookey et al. 2001]. Similar debates have shrouded 
the development of partnering [e.g., Bresnen and Marshall 2000]. However, the literature suggests a 
growing consensus that there is no ‘best-buy’ procurement solution and that procurement selection 
should be based on a contingency approach [Rowlinson 1999b].  
 
Whatever the difference of opinion concerning these procurement systems and delivery 
mechanisms, it is quite clear that relying on a single procurement arrangement is not sufficient to 
promote the achievement of VfM in public procurement. The proliferation of procurement systems 
and the many delivery techniques, at least, are a reflection of the determination of the global 
construction industry to walk towards a brighter future and to address long-known and recognised 
problems. A structured approach considering all procurement arrangements and project delivery 
modalities is considered the best way to secure VfM [Kumaraswamy 1998]. The concept of choice, 
which these alternative systems bring into play, is, of itself, a great advantage as it forces a 
systematic evaluation of the project requirements, the contextual conditions and risks and thus 
facilitates ‘best value’-focused decision making. However, our understanding of culture, and the 
differing motivations for human behaviour it presents, implies that great care needs to be exercised 
when considering the use of these innovative concepts in construction procurement [Bresnen and 
Marshall 2000, Hofstede 1980, Muriithi and Crawford 2003]. Nonetheless, these procurement 
systems and delivery techniques are paradigmatic and with reasoned application can contribute to 
the realisation of Ghana’s quest for VfM in public construction.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The PPA establishes the legal and institutional framework for ensuring transparency, probity and 
accountability in public construction procurement. The wider reform programme described above 
will guarantee the rule of law and the protection of private property rights. These reforms create an 
investor-friendly environment in a country where there is an acute shortage of infrastructure 
services. Proactive governance and further initiatives are however required to complete the VfM 
equation. In particular, the ‘fixed constraints syndrome’ and the largely price-based contractor 
selection strategies will need to be reviewed. Procurement planning and project organisational 
structures must be tailored to meet particular needs.  
  
 
The various procurement systems and delivery modalities provide reasonable scope for achieving 
this objective. The reasoned application of these alternative approaches will contribute to the 
realisation of Ghana’s quest for VfM in public construction. A framework for guiding the 
implementation of the PPA and other alternative procurement arrangements and modalities will be 
required to sustain the momentum to reform, and improve the scope for achieving VfM in, the 
public procurement function. Such a framework has been proposed in Anvuur [2002]. A strongly 
committed task force, as also suggested by the 2003 CPAR, should be created to support the work 
of carrying out priority tasks in connection with the proposed framework.  
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This paper is based in part on the MSc dissertation of the primary author [Anvuur 2002]. The Ford 
Foundation’s International Fellowships Programme is gratefully acknowledged for sponsoring the 
study reported here.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
Aniekwu, A N and Okpala, D C (1988) The effect of systemic factors in contract services in 
Nigeria. Construction Management and Economics, 6, 171-182. 
Anvuur, A M (2002) Towards a Shift in Paradigm: a Comparative Study of UK and Ghanaian 
Public Sector Construction Procurement, Unpublished MSc Thesis, Department of Civil 
Engineering, University of Leeds. 
Ayirebi, D (2005) Strategic planning practice of construction firms in Ghana. Construction 
Management and Economics, 23(2), 163-168. 
Bowen, P A, Hindle, R D and Pearl, R G (1997) The effectiveness of building procurement systems 
in the attainment of client objectives. In: Davidson, C H and Meguid, T A A (Eds.), 
International Symposium of Commission W92 CIB: Procurement - A Key to Innovation, 
Montreal. University of Montreal, 39-49. 
Bresnen, M and Marshall, N (2000) Partnering in construction: a critical review of issues, problems 
and dilemmas. Construction Management and Economics, 18(2), 229-237. 
Crown Agents (1998) The World Bank Procurement Audit in Ghana. Value for Money Audit 
Report for Ghana,  Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations Ltd, UK. 
Eyiah, A K and Cook, P (2003) Financing small and medium-scale contractors in developing 
countries: a Ghana case study. Construction Management and Economics, 21(4), 357-367. 
Hamilton, I W (1987) Developing expert systems for management applications. In: Brandon, P S 
(Ed.), Building Cost Modeling and Computers, pp. 441-451. London: E & FN Spon. 
Hofstede, G H (1980) Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values. 
Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications. 
Kumaraswamy, M M (1994) Growth strategies for less developed construction industries. In: 
Skitmore, R M and Betts, M (Eds.), 10th Annual ARCOM Conference, September 14-16, 
Loughborough University. Association of Researchers in Construction Management, Vol. 
1, 154-163. 
Kumaraswamy, M M (1998) Industry development through creative project packaging and 
integrated management. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 5(3), 
228-237. 
  
Latham, M (1994) Constructing The Team. Final report of the Government/Industry review of 
procurement and contractual arrangements in the UK construction industry, London: 
HMSO. 
Lopes, J (1998) The construction industry and macroeconomy in Sub-Saharan Africa post 1970. 
Construction Management and Economics, 16(6), 637-649. 
Ministry of Finance (2001) Procurement Reform Proposals. A component of the Public Financial 
Management and Reform Programme (PURFMARP), Accra: Ministry of Finance, Ghana. 
Muriithi, N and Crawford, L (2003) Approaches to project management in Africa: implications for 
international development projects. International Journal of Project Management, 21(5), 
309-319. 
Palaneeswaran, E, Kumaraswamy, M M and Zhang, X Q (2001) Reforging construction supply 
chains: a source selection perspective. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 8(1), 7-12. 
Rowlinson, S M (1999a) A definition of procurement system. In: Rowlinson, S M and McDermott, 
P (Eds.), Procurement systems: a guide to best practice in construction, pp. 27-54. London: 
New York: E & FN Spon; Routledge. 
Rowlinson, S M (1999b) Selection criteria. In: Rowlinson, S M and McDermott, P (Eds.), 
Procurement systems: a guide to best practice in construction, pp. 276-299. London: New 
York: E & FN Spon; Routledge. 
Rwelamila, P D, Talukhaba, A A and Ngowi, A B (1999) Tracing the African Project Failure 
Syndrome: the significance of 'ubuntu'. Engineering, Construction and Architectural 
Management, 6(4), 335-346. 
Rwelamila, P M D and Meyer, C (1996) Appropriate or default project procurement systems? Cost 
Engineering, 41(9), 40-44. 
Tang, H (2001) Construct for Excellence. Report of the Construction Industry Review Committee, 
Hong Kong: Construction Industry Review Committee (CIRC). 
Tookey, J E, Hardcastle, C, Murray, M and Langford, D (2001) Construction procurement routes: 
re-defining the contours of construction procurement. Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management, 8(1), 20. 
Westring, G (1997) Ghana Public Procurement Reform. An Audit Report prepared for the World 
Bank, Stockholm: Advokatfirman Cederquist KB. 
World Bank (1995) Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, Washington, 
DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (1996) Ghana 1996 Country Procurement Assessment Report, Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
World Bank (1997) Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank 
Borrowers, Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank (2003) Ghana 2003 Country Procurement Assessment Report, Washington, DC: 
Ghana Country Department, The World Bank. 
